

# Ensayos

## sobre POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA



ECONOMIC GROWTH IN COLOMBIA:  
A REVERSAL OF 'FORTUNE'?

MAURICIO CÁRDENAS

ENSAYOS SOBRE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA,  
VOL. 25, NÚM. 53,  
EDICIÓN ESPECIAL PRODUCTIVIDAD Y CRECIMIENTO  
PP. 220-259

Los derechos de reproducción de este documento son propiedad de la revista Ensayos Sobre Política Económica (ESPE). El documento puede ser reproducido libremente para uso académico, siempre y cuando no se obtenga lucro por este concepto y además, cada copia incluya la referencia bibliográfica de ESPE. El(los) autor(es) del documento puede(n) además poner en su propio website una versión electrónica del mismo, pero incluyendo la referencia bibliográfica de ESPE. La reproducción de esta revista para cualquier otro fin, o su colocación en cualquier otro website, requerirá autorización previa de su Editor de ESPE.

## CRECIMIENTO ECONÓMICO COLOMBIANO: ¿CAMBIO DE “SUERTE”?

MAURICIO CÁRDENAS\*

\* Una primera versión de este documento fue escrita en una visita al Centro para el Desarrollo Internacional de la Universidad de Harvard, el cual prestó su generosa hospitalidad y apoyo financiero. Quisiera agradecer a Óscar Becerra, Carlos Eduardo Sandoval, Rodrigo Peláez, y Gustavo Suárez por su excelente asistencia de investigación en las diferentes etapas del proyecto. Asimismo, agradezco a Catherine Rodríguez, Leonardo Villar, y a los tres evaluadores anónimos por sus valiosos comentarios y sugerencias. Norman Loayza, Dani Rodrik, y Jeff Frankel generosamente compartieron sus datos, y Sergei Antoshin y Jeromin Zettlemeyer prestaron una muy útil retroalimentación en la estimación de cambios estructurales. Por último, reitero mi agradecimiento a los participantes de los seminarios realizados en Fedesarrollo, la Universidad de los Andes, el Banco de la República y Lacea.

Director Ejecutivo de Fedesarrollo.

Correo electrónico:  
mcardenas@fedesarrollo.org.co

Documento recibido el 10 de abril de 2006; versión final aceptada el 17 de octubre de 2006.

Desde 1979 el crecimiento anual del PIB en Colombia ha estado en promedio dos puntos porcentuales por debajo del crecimiento observado entre 1950 y 1980. Las fuentes de descomposición del crecimiento revelan que esta desaceleración está explicada por cambios en la productividad; en efecto, entre 1960 y 1980 las ganancias en productividad aumentaron el producto por trabajador en casi un punto porcentual por año. Desde 1980, las pérdidas de productividad han *reducido* el producto por trabajador a una tasa similar. El análisis de series de tiempo sugiere que la contracción de productividad fue causada por un aumento en la criminalidad, la cual desvió el capital y la mano de obra hacia actividades improductivas. Las mayores tasas de criminalidad fueron resultado de la rápida expansión del tráfico de drogas, cuyo punto de partida se puede situar alrededor de 1980. De tal manera, la riqueza asociada con el surgimiento de Colombia como el más grande productor de cocaína tuvo un efecto negativo sobre el crecimiento y la productividad. Esta explicación se encuentra apoyada por comparaciones entre países, las cuales revelan que el bajo crecimiento de Colombia, especialmente en la década de los años noventa, se explica por sus altas tasas de homicidios.

**Clasificación JEL:** 047, Z13.

**Palabras clave:** crecimiento económico, productividad, capital social, crimen y conflicto.

## ECONOMIC GROWTH IN COLOMBIA: A REVERSAL OF 'FORTUNE'?

MAURICIO CÁRDENAS\*

Since 1979, Colombia's annual GDP growth has been on average two percentage points lower than what was observed between 1950 and 1980. The sources-of-growth decomposition shows that this deceleration can be accounted entirely by changes in productivity. Indeed, between 1960 and 1980 productivity gains increased output per worker by nearly 1% per year. Since 1980, productivity losses have *reduced* output per worker at about the same rate. The time series analysis suggests that the implosion of productivity was caused by the increase in criminality which diverted capital and labor to unproductive activities. In turn, the rise in crime was the result of rapid expansion in drug-trafficking activities, which erupted around 1980. Consequently, the fortunes associated with the emergence of Colombia as the world largest producer of cocaine had a significantly negative effect on growth and productivity. This explanation is supported by cross-country evidence that shows that Colombia's underperformance, especially in the 1990s, is explained by its high homicide rate.

**JEL classification:** O47, Z13.

**Keywords:** Economic growth, productivity, social capital, crime and conflict.

---

\* A first version of this paper was written while visiting the Center of International Development at Harvard University, which provided generous hospitality and financial support. I would like to thank Oscar Becerra, Carlos Eduardo Sandoval, Rodrigo Peláez, and Gustavo Suárez for outstanding research assistance at different stages during the project. I am grateful to Catherine Rodríguez, Leonardo Villar, and three anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. Norman Loayza, Dani Rodrik, and Jeff Frankel generously shared their data, and Sergei Antoshin and Jeromin Zettlemeyer provided excellent feedback on the estimation of structural breaks. I also thank seminar participants at Fedesarrollo, Universidad de los Andes, Banco de la República and Lacea.

Executive Director of  
Fedesarrollo

E-mail: mcardenas@  
fedesarrollo.org.co

Document received: 10  
April 2006; final version  
accepted 17 October  
2006.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Colombia has traditionally been regarded as a success story in terms of economic growth and stability. According to Figure 1A, this reputation is based on the macroeconomic performance between the 1930s and 1970s, characterized by increasing GDP growth rates combined with a reduction in volatility (measured by the standard deviation in growth rates). In fact, GDP growth rose to an annual average of 5.8% during the 1970s from 3.8% during the 1930s. The standard deviation in the growth rate fell from around 3% during the 1930s and 1940s to 1% during the 1960s (and then rose to 1.7% during the 1970s in spite of much sharper external shocks relative to previous decades).

As shown in Figure 1B, per capita GDP growth rates show similar trends. In this case, the acceleration in growth was particularly significant during the 1960s and 1970s. The economics profession, both nationally and internationally, impressed with this performance, considered Colombia a paradigm of sound macroeconomic management, praising the combination of able technocrats and sound institutions as the key driving elements of this success story.


As in every other Latin American country, growth decelerated significantly during the 1980s. Figures 1A and 1B show that very clearly: average GDP growth fell to 3.4% per year, while the annual per capita GDP growth was 1.2% (nearly two percentage points below the rate observed in the previous decade). This was, of course, Latin America's "lost decade" when GDP contractions were the norm in the region. In fact, at that time Colombia was seen as an over-performer mainly because it did not default on its debt and did not experience negative economic growth, contrary to

Figure 1

A. Colombia: GDP Growth Rates



B. Colombia: Per Capita GDP Growth Rates



Source: Author's calculations based on National Accounts data from DANE.

was observed in many other Latin American countries. However, during the 1990s Colombia's economic growth decelerated even further—to an average per capita growth rate of 0.9% per year—. This was a surprising result for two reasons. First, almost every other country in the region (with the exception of Paraguay) had higher growth during the 1990s relative to the 1980s. Second, Colombia adopted a package of reforms in the early 1990s with the explicit goal of accelerating growth.

This paper deals with several issues related with this reversal in economic fortune. It starts by analyzing the time series evidence in order to test for structural breaks in Colombia's postwar economic growth data. The evidence, which is robust to various specifications and methodologies, indicates that a downbreak in growth rates occurred in 1979. Furthermore, using standard growth decomposition exercises, the paper shows that the reduction in economic growth can be explained by the reduction in productivity, rather than a deceleration in the rate of accumulation of physical and human capital.

In searching for more fundamental determinants, the paper finds that the unexpected (and quantitatively large) increases in crime rates (measured by homicides and kidnappings) were the driving force behind the deceleration in growth. In turn, higher crime rates were the result of the expansion of drug-trafficking activities, which took off during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In other words, although initially perceived as favorable to the economy, the sudden increase in illicit exports did in fact become a curse, causing a major reversal in terms of growth performance.

This explanation differs from the more traditional views on recent growth performance in Colombia, based on the role of external shocks, fiscal management, and the consequences of a comprehensive structural reform package introduced in the early 1990s. In fact, most explanations have highlighted the role of the debt crisis in the 1980s, the growing fiscal deficit during the 1990s, and the adoption of the 'Washington Consensus' package (especially trade liberalization and central bank independence) during the 1990s. In the case of the latter, some analyses argue that the adoption of the package was the cause of low growth, while others consider that low growth has been the result of the lack of additional reforms that are necessary for the package to deliver better results.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Ocampo (2004) argues that the sequencing and speed of structural reforms was not helpful to growth. At the other end, Edwards and Steiner (2000) underscore the lack of comprehensiveness in Colombia's reform package.

This paper searches for an alternative explanation framed in the context of the recent growth literature and the cross-national evidence. After analyzing the underlying factors that explain economic growth in Colombia it concludes that the ‘fortunes’ generated by drug-trafficking —which exacerbated crime and violence— explain the change in economic performance in Colombia since 1980.

In other words, the paper identifies a fortuitous event that interacted with some initial conditions —high levels of inequality and poverty and the weak presence of the state in certain areas of the country— that was able to alter the growth trajectory for over two decades. In addition, the initial shock induced further changes in the institutions and policies, leading to the vicious circle of low growth and high crime. More concretely, the sudden increase in drug-trafficking set in motion a chain reaction which not only exacerbated crime and conflict (with a consequent negative impact on productivity) but possibly also had an adverse effect on the ability to conduct more prudent macroeconomic policies. The increase in government expenditures and the resulting fiscal deficit were, to some extent, the result of the conflict itself.<sup>2</sup>

The analytical narrative is carried out at three different levels. First, using the standard sources-of-growth accounting, the paper presents new evidence on the ‘proximate’ determinants of growth: a) physical capital deepening; b) human capital accumulation; and c) productivity growth. As is well known, this decomposition has limitations because accumulation and productivity are endogenous factors. In spite of the shortcomings, the decomposition shows that most of the ‘explanation’ of the reversal of growth in Colombia can be attributed to total factor productivity. However, this does not provide a structural interpretation of what caused the growth deceleration in Colombia.

Second, the paper analyzes the ‘deep’ or ‘fundamental’ determinants of growth. Recent growth studies have focused on the role of physical geography and institutions in determining the long-run performance of nations. This paper argues that an interaction between these two forces led to lower growth. Colombia has the ideal geographical location and the ecological systems for the development of the illicit

---

<sup>2</sup> Additional expenditures to preserve the rule of law (e. g. defense and justice) are one example of the links between conflict and fiscal outcomes.

drug business. In turn, these activities deteriorated institutional quality (e.g., the protection of property rights) with a negative effect on economic outcomes.

The paper is divided in five additional sections. Section II deals with the time series evidence and applies a simple procedure in order to identify a structural downbreak in Colombia's GDP growth since 1979. Section III presents the standard sources-of-growth decomposition in order to quantify the role of physical and human capital accumulation, as well as technological change in per-worker GDP growth. The evidence indicates that productivity is the key driving force behind the reduction in growth since 1979. Using time series data, section IV shows that the higher levels of crime and violence were the cause, and not a consequence, of the productivity implosion during the 1980s and 1990s. Section V looks into this issue using some cross-country regressions. Section VI concludes.

## II. GROWTH REVERSAL: TIME SERIES FACTS

The purpose of this section is to identify structural breaks in Colombia's post-war economic growth. We follow closely the empirical strategy of Berg *et al.* (2006) and apply the two-step procedure proposed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a) aimed at testing for multiple structural breaks in a single time series, when both the total number and the potential location of those breaks are unknown. In the first step, the procedure identifies all possible breaks and estimates their statistical significance using  $F$  tests. If there is evidence of at least one structural break, the procedure then selects the optimal number of breaks using information criteria, such as the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) or the modified Schwartz criterion (LWZ). Alternatively to information criteria, Bai and Perron (2003a) suggest to use a sequential  $F$  statistic, which tests the null hypothesis of 0 breaks against 1 break; if the null is rejected, then a new break is added and the test is performed again, testing the null of 1 break versus 2 breaks, and so on.

In empirical work, an important issue is concerned with the selection of the minimum number of years between breaks  $h$  (known as the "interstitial period"). This decision involves a trade-off because choosing a long interstitial period (say  $h = 10$  years) means that the procedure can miss some true breaks that are less than 10 years apart. But, on the other hand, a short interstitial period implies the use of very small subsamples with as few as  $2h + 1$  observations.



A shorter sample lowers the power of the test (i. e. the null hypothesis of no structural break is not rejected when it should be rejected).

We use annual GDP growth data between 1951 and 2005, so the total sample size ( $T$ ) is equal to 55 observations. Additionally, we impose a relatively long interstitial period,  $h = 13$ , to minimize the problem of small subsamples. Thus, the maximum number of breaks allowed by the procedure,  $m$ , where  $m = \text{int}[T/h] - 1$ , is equal to 3.

Table 1 and Figure 2 summarize the results which robustly support the presence of a downbreak in 1979.<sup>3</sup> According to the estimates, GDP growth fell to 3.2% between 1980 and 2005, from 5.2% between 1951 and 1979. This is a significant alteration in growth path: while output doubled every 13 years before 1979, it has taken 22 years after then. How is that change explained? What caused such a large reduction in growth? These are the questions to which we now turn.

### III. PROXIMATE CAUSES OF GROWTH: ACCUMULATION AND PRODUCTIVITY

This section closely follows the framework developed in Hall and Jones (1999) in order to estimate the contribution to growth of changes in the capital-output ratio, changes in the educational attainment of the population, and changes in productivity. Using the simplest Cobb-Douglas approach, assume that output  $Y_t$  in period  $t$  is produced according to:

$$Y_t = K_t^\alpha (A_t H_t)^{1-\alpha},$$

where  $K_t$  denotes the stock of physical capital,  $H_t$  is the amount of human capital-augmented labor used in production, and  $A_t$  is the labor-augmenting measure of

<sup>3</sup> The dates and number of breaks remained constant for shorter interstitial periods. In addition, we applied the methodology presented in Ben-David and Papell (1997) who estimating an equation of the form:  $\Delta y_t = \mu + \theta D_t + \sum_{j=1}^k c_j \Delta y_{t-j} + \varepsilon_t$

Where  $y$  is the log of GDP;  $\mu$  is a constant;  $D_t$  is a dummy variable that takes a unitary value if  $t > T_B$ , where  $T_B$  is an arbitrary break in the sample. The coefficient  $\theta$  captures the effect of structural changes in economic growth. Using all the possible values for  $T_B$  we test the null hypothesis of no structural change in growth ( $\theta = 0$ ) and compare the t-statistic of all the estimated values of  $\theta$  (using  $k = 4$  based on the Akaike information criterion). The structural change corresponding to  $T_B = 1979$  has the maximum t-statistic.

Table 1  
 Results of the Bai-Perron Test (presence of structural breaks in GDP growth)  
 Series: Colombia GDP growth, 1951-2005

Specifications			
$z_t = \{1\}$	$h = 13$	$m = 2$	$T = 55$
Tests <sup>a/</sup>			
supF(1)	supF(2)	UDmax	WDmax
6.6666*	4.5130	6.6666*	6.6666*
supF(1 0)	supF(2 1)		
6.6666*	2.5893		
Number of breaks selected			
Sequential	BIC	LWZ	
1	1	1	
Parameter estimates with one break (std. errors in brackets)			
$\delta_1$	$\delta_2$	$T_1$	
5.1747	3.1879	1979	
(0.3532)	(0.3730)		

a/ For all tests and calculations of standard errors, a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix using a quadratic kernel with automatic bandwidth selection based on an AR(1) approximation is used. Residuals are pre-whitened using a VAR(1). See Bai and Perron (2003a).  
 \* Significant at 10% level.  
 Source: Author's calculations.

productivity. Assume that each unit of labor ( $L_t$ ) has been trained with  $E_t$  years of schooling. Human capital-augmented labor is given by:

$$H_t = e^{\phi(E_t)} L_t.$$


According to this specification, the function  $\phi(E)$  reflects the efficiency of a unit of labor with  $E$  years of schooling relative to one with no schooling ( $\phi(0) = 0$ ). The derivative  $\phi'(E)$  measures the effect on efficiency of an additional year of schooling, which corresponds to the return to schooling estimated in a Mincerian wage regression.

Rewriting the production function in terms of output per-worker,  $y \equiv Y/L$ , we obtain:


$$y_t = \left( \frac{K_t}{Y_t} \right)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} h_t A_t,$$

Figure 2  
Structural Break

A. Colombia: GDP



B. Colombia: GDP growth rates



Note: Minimum period between structural breaks was set to  $h = 13$  years.  
Source: Author's calculations based on National Accounts from DANE.


where  $h_t$  is human capital per worker. Taking logs and first-differences:

$$\Delta \ln y_t = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \Delta \ln \left( \frac{K_t}{Y_t} \right) + \Delta \phi(E_t) + \Delta \ln A_t.$$

This equation allows us to decompose growth in output per worker into changes in physical capital intensity, growth in human capital per worker (educational attainment), and growth in productivity (the residual). Note that writing the decomposition in terms of the capital-output ratio rather than the capital-labor ratio facilitates the interpretation because the former is proportional to the investment rate (along a balanced growth path).<sup>4</sup>

To proceed with the decomposition we use data on output (GDP), labor input (employment), average educational attainment, and physical capital for the 1950-2005 period. Figure 3 shows the average years of schooling of the urban and rural population based on the population censuses and the household surveys.<sup>5</sup> It is interesting

Figure 3  
 Average Years of Schooling  
 (population over 15 years of age)



Source: *Estadísticas históricas de Colombia*, Cuadro 7.3 (1954-1996), and calculations from DNP-DDS for the period 1997-2005.

<sup>4</sup> It is also interesting to note that GDP per worker (compared to GDP per capita) is a better measure of welfare when nonmarket production is important.

<sup>5</sup> The source is (*Estadísticas históricas de Colombia*, Cuadro 7.3 (1954-1996)) and calculations from DNP-DDS for the period 1997-2005.

to note that the educational attainment has been increasing at a stable rate since the early 1970s. Even though faster progress on this front was made between 1965 and 1973, this is not a likely factor in explaining the origin of the growth reversal.

Returns to schooling are a key input in order to construct the function  $\phi(E)$ . Núñez and Sánchez (2000) estimate a Mincer equation and provide this information. According to their results, which are based on the quarterly household surveys for the period 1976-1998, the rates of return to education in Colombia do not have the standard concavity that has been obtained for other countries (see Table 2). In fact, the returns to education per year of education (for individuals with 11 years of schooling) are 10% for men and 16% for women. These levels are about the same as the ones observed for individuals with five years of schooling, corresponding to primary education. Workers with completed higher education have the highest returns to education (21.5%). For comparison, Figure 4 includes a measure of  $\phi(E)$  based on the more standard concave returns to education such as the ones obtained by Psacharopoulos (1994).<sup>6</sup>

The stock of capital was constructed using the perpetual inventory model on disaggregated investment data since 1925. For the year 2005, the stock of capital corresponds to


Table 2  
Returns to Education  
(based on the estimation of the Mincer equation)

Years of schooling	Total	Men	Women
0-4	0.0853	0.0763	0.0830
5	0.1214	0.1029	0.1576
6-10	0.0761	0.0618	0.1021
11	0.1369	0.1018	0.1595
12-15	0.1201	0.1238	0.1127
16+	0.2158	0.2320	0.2026
<b>Average</b>	<b>0.1020</b>	<b>0.0923</b>	<b>0.1152</b>

Source: Núñez and Sánchez (2000).

<sup>6</sup> According to this source, the rate of return (per year of education) for the first four years of education is 13.4%, for the next four years it falls to 10.1%, and to 6.8% for education beyond the 8<sup>th</sup> year. The main results of this paper do not change when these alternative returns to schooling are used.

Figure 4  
 Measurement of the  $\Phi(E)$  Function



Source: Own calculations based on returns to schooling from Psacharopoulos (1994) and Núñez and Sánchez (2000).

the sum of all investment since 1925, net of depreciation.<sup>7</sup> Although the methodology underestimates the stock of capital for earlier dates, the capital stock is only used for the 1955-2005 period (due to the limitations with data on years of schooling prior to 1955). Thus, in practice at least 30 years of investment data are considered for each observation of the stock of capital.


Before showing the results of the decomposition it is useful to take a cursory look at the raw data. Figure 5 plots output per worker against the capital/output ratio for the period 1955-2005 (in logs). Interestingly, there seems to be a regime change in 1979. The pre-1979 period is characterized by an increase in output per worker and a decrease in the capital/output ratio, suggesting that productivity played a role in explaining the increase in output per worker. In contrast, between 1979 and 1999, increases in the capital/output ratio were proportionally larger than increases in output

<sup>7</sup> We use a 8% depreciation rate for machinery and furniture, 20% for transportation equipment, and 2% for housing and construction. The weighted average rate of depreciation is 4.9%.

per worker. This can be taken as evidence that the accumulation of physical capital is not likely to be the cause of the deceleration in growth since 1979.

This is indeed what the decomposition shows. Table 3 presents the results of the decomposition exercise using the returns to education derived from Núñez and Sánchez

Figure 5  
Capital/Output Ratio and Output per Worker



Source: Author's calculations.

Table 3  
Sources of Growth Decomposition  
(percentage)

Growth in:	GDP per worker (1) + (2) + (3)	Capital output ratio (1)	Human capital per capita (2)	Productivity (3)
1955-1979	1.55	-0.25	0.74	1.05
1980-2005	0.80	0.47	0.92	-0.60
1955-1959	1.31	0.31	0.26	0.72
1970-1979	1.91	-0.34	1.02	1.23
1980-1989	0.63	0.38	1.08	-0.84
1990-1999	1.13	1.00	0.80	-0.68
2000-2005	0.53	-0.28	0.87	-0.06

Source: Author's calculations.

(2000) and an estimated capital share ( $\alpha$ ) between 0.2 and 0.4 (we report the results corresponding to 0.3).<sup>8</sup> The results show that annual growth in output per worker fell to 0.8% between 1980 and 2005, from 1.6% between 1955 and 1979. Figure 6 shows the estimated total factor productivity.<sup>9</sup>

The decomposition indicates that the reduction in output growth cannot be explained by changes in physical and human capital intensity. In fact, physical capital intensity (i. e. capital/output ratio) was a positive source of growth between 1979 and 2005 (adding on average 0.5 percentage points to the growth rate per year). The same is true for human capital per worker, which was a steady source of growth in output per worker. Indeed, during the post-1979 this factor alone would have accounted for an annual growth in output per worker of 0.9%. This means that, between 1979 and 2005, the educational advancement of the population and the greater physical capital intensity would have resulted in a 1.4 percent growth rate in output per worker, no too different from what was observed before 1979. If anything, physical and human capital alone would have resulted in higher output growth in the post-1979 period, relative to the pre-1979 results.

This leaves the residual (i.e. productivity) as the key 'explanation' of the low growth outcomes. In terms of the accounting, productivity added 1 percentage point in output growth per year up until 1979. Between 1979 and 2005 it subtracted 0.6 percentage points in the growth of output per worker per annum. In other words, the growth deceleration appears to be a simple reflection of a major reversal in productivity growth.

The information per decades is also shown in Table 3. Output per worker grew at an annual rate of 1.3 percent in the late 1950s and the 1960s, and then accelerated to 1.9 percent during the 1970s. It then fell to 0.6 percent during the 1980s and 1.1 percent during the 1990s.

As mentioned, the contribution of human capital accumulation to economic growth has been relatively stable, reflecting the relatively continuous progress in educational attainment (or, at least, reflecting the parsimony of the years of schooling data). There is, however, an interesting difference in the role of productivity when comparing the

---


<sup>8</sup> These results remain unchanged under the alternative measurement of the returns of education. The same occurs when  $\alpha = 0.2$  and  $\alpha = 0.4$  are used.

<sup>9</sup> The Bai-Perron test finds a downbreak in of TFP growth in 1974 (robust to the choice of  $h$ ).




Figure 6

A. Colombia: estimated total factor productivity (TFP)



B. Colombia: estimated total factor productivity growth rates



Notes: TFP was computed assuming an alpha equal to 0.3, minimum period between breaks was set to  $h = 13$  years.  
Source: Author's calculations based on National Accounts from DANE.

1980s and the 1990s. The 1980s emerge as a period of negative productivity growth and low physical capital deepening (incidentally, the two factors often mentioned in the literature as justifying the structural reforms of the early 1990s). In contrast, during the 1990s, capital intensity increased (as a consequence of the investment boom that resulted from trade liberalization, capital inflows, and currency appreciation), while productivity growth collapsed even more during this period.

#### IV. EXPLAINING THE GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY IMPLOSION

It is extremely difficult to point towards changes in the political system or in economic policies in order to explain the deceleration in economic growth since 1980. On the one hand, most legal and constitutional reforms occurred in the early 1990s, almost ten years after the decline in growth. Although the economy experienced a negative external shock during the early 1980s, mainly due to the end of the coffee boom of the late 1970s and the beginning of the debt crisis, it is hard to argue that this sole factor could explain such a long-lasting deceleration in growth. Not only coffee has become much less relevant for the economy but also it is a well-established fact that the debt crisis was not as severe for Colombia as for other highly-indebted nations. Therefore, it is necessary to look into other areas in order to find the explanation for the productivity implosion.

The emergence of Colombia as a major illicit drug producer is perhaps the most prominent aspect of the country's recent economic and political history. According to data from the United Nations ([www.unodc.org](http://www.unodc.org)) cocaine production, which was practically inexistent in 1980, grew to 90 tons in 1990 and then rose to 700 tons in 2000. The area under cultivation of illicit crops increased to nearly 140,000 hectares in 2000, from less than 20,000 in 1980. The standard argument is that coca production in Colombia substituted imports of coca paste from Bolivia and Peru. Between 1980 and 2000, Colombia became the largest cocaine producer in the world, arguably controlling 80% of the supply.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Estimations of the proceeds from the drug trade are highly speculative. Some conservative measures (see Steiner, 1997 and Rocha, 2000) put a low boundary in the US\$2-3 billion per year range (around 3% of GDP). However, apart from the concerns on the quality of area and production data, the issue of which price to use is highly controversial. According to Miron (2001), in 1998 the price of the coca leave necessary to produce one gram of pure cocaine was between US\$0.36-US\$0.57. The price of one gram of cocaine in the Colombian wholesale market was US\$1.50-US\$2.00, and US\$12.00-US\$18.00 in the U.S. wholesale market. The price paid by the final consumer was US\$122.00. This

The expansion of drug-trafficking activities can be linked to the collapse of productivity, mainly through the effect of drug-trafficking on crime and violence. The homicide rate (homicides per 100,000 population) increased to 62 on average during the 1990s, from 41 during the 1980s, 23 during the 1970s, and 19 during the 1960s. A similar pattern can be observed for kidnapping rates. The increase in the homicide rate, in turn, is related to the increase in the activities of insurgent and paramilitary groups.

Figures 7a and 7b plot the area under coca cultivation, as well as homicide and kidnapping rates.<sup>11</sup> The strong relationship between these variables has been the subject of a number of studies that argue that the extraction of rents from primary goods (such as oil and coca) has strengthened the military capacity of the insurgent groups. One example is Collier (2000, p. 21), who points that:

“[...] economic characteristics —dependence on primary commodity exports, low average incomes, slow growth, and large diasporas— are all significant and powerful predictors of civil war. Rebellions either have the objective of natural resource predation, or are critically dependent upon natural resource predation in order to pursue other objectives [...]”

In the Colombian context, the predatory behavior of the insurgent groups in their regions of influence has been documented by Rangel (2000). Virtually no one, including the rebels, questions the fact that the expansion of the insurgent groups during the 1980s and 1990s —both in terms of their ability to recruit and the sophistication of their arms— was based on the extraction of rents from the growing cocaine business.<sup>12</sup>

The relationship between drug-trafficking and overall criminality has been analyzed by Gaviria (2000). He argues that expansion of drug-trafficking activities not only

---


means that the price was multiplied 73 times between Colombia and the streets of the U.S. In the case of coffee, this factor ranges between 29 and 34 times.

<sup>11</sup> Data on illicit crop cultivation come from Arango *et al.* (2004) for the period 1976-2003 and from the Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos (SIMCI, 2006) for 2004-2005. Data on Homicide comes from “Reportes de criminalidad” (Policía Nacional, DIJIN, Various Issues). Kidnappings come from statistics of the Departamento Nacional de Planeación based on Ministerio de Defensa and Fondelibertad. Population data was taken from Flórez (2000) and DANE (after 2000).


<sup>12</sup> In their public statements, FARC-EP (the largest rebel organization) justify the extraction of rents as a tax levied on the small coca growers in exchange for protection.

Figure 7

A. Homicide Rate vs. Area Under Coca Cultivation



B. Kidnapping Rate vs. Area Under Coca Cultivation



Source: Policia Nacional, Ministerio de Defensa, Arango *et al.* (2004) and Simci.

had a direct impact on crime but also indirectly through the effect on the congestion of the judicial system and the consequent reduction in the probability of punishment. Also, the change in moral values and the diffusion of crime technologies had a negative effect on overall delinquency.

Social capital or social infrastructure is, arguably, the main channel linking crime and violence, on the one hand, and productivity on the other.<sup>13</sup> Lederman, Loayza, and Menéndez (2002, p. 509) have provided empirical evidence showing a strong negative relationship between violent crime and social capital which they define as “[...] The set of rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and society’s institutional arrangements which enables its members to achieve their individual and community objectives...” As they point out, the relationship between social capital and crime may run in both directions. The incidence of violent crime may diminish social capital, such as trust, or may increase it, through the formation of community organizations to fight crime.<sup>14</sup> However, the evidence suggests that the erosion of social capital is the dominant factor.

The relationship between productivity and social capital or social infrastructure has been a recurrent theme in the recent growth literature. In an influential paper, Hall and Jones (1999) argue that the lack of social infrastructure encourages predatory behavior. Under these circumstances a fraction of the population is employed in unproductive activities, either by engaging in crime-related activities or by protecting their human and physical assets, making no contribution to output. In addition, some of the physical capital can be diverted to unproductive activities. Defense equipment is perhaps the best example. This form of diversion is captured in the productivity component of the sources-of-growth accounting. Similarly, the productivity term captures the contribution of other factors of production (e.g., land) that may become unusable when it is too costly to protect them.

---

<sup>13</sup> The term social infrastructure is more precise because it refers to elements that are not really factors of production.

<sup>14</sup> Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer (1999) examine the relationship between social capital and homicide in the U.S., while Moser and Holland (1997) and Moser and Shrader (1998) analyze this issue with data for Latin America and conclude that “[t]here are often higher levels of participation in community action groups in less violent areas”.

From a different angle, social capital, or 'trust', decreases the costs of social transactions, such as the costs of negotiations, enforcement, etc. In the words of Robison and Siles, as quoted by Loayza *et al.* (2005, p. 5): "[...] transaction costs are reduced by increases in social capital because each party to the trade has his well-being linked to the well-being of his or her trading partner".

In sum, there are multiple channels through which an increase in crime can cause output and productivity losses. We now turn to the evidence in favor of the argument that the expansion of drug-trafficking activities was the main factor behind the exponential increase in crime rates which in turn, had a negative effect on growth.

#### A. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

This section presents some basic evidence that supports the main hypotheses of this paper. We start by reporting the cross correlations between drug trafficking (area under cultivation), homicide rate, and productivity (all in growth rates). These correlations suggest that contemporaneous and past increases in the area under illicit crops are associated with higher crime rates, while higher homicide rates (present and past) are negatively correlated with growth in total factor productivity.


In particular, Figure 8a shows that present and past (up to six years before) changes in the area cultivated with illicit crops are positively and significantly correlated with growth in homicide rates. Figure 8b shows that the opposite is not necessarily true: past changes in the homicide rate do not seem to be significantly correlated with growth in illicit crops.

Regarding the relationship between TFP and homicides, Figure 8c shows a negative (and significant) correlation between present and past changes (up to 12 years before) in the homicide rates and contemporaneous TFP growth. Again, the opposite is not true: past changes in TFP do not seem to bear any relationship with the contemporaneous crime rates (Figure 8d).


Finally, there is a negative correlation between past changes in the area under illicit crops (up to two years before) and contemporaneous changes in TFP (Figure 8e). However, past changes in TFP do not seem to be significantly correlated with current growth in illicit crops (Figure 8f).

Figure 8  
Partial Correlations


A. Between homicide rate ( $t$ ) and illicit crop area ( $t - i$ )




B. Between illicit crop area ( $t$ ) and homicide rate ( $t - i$ )




C. Between productivity ( $t$ ) and homicide rate ( $t - i$ )




D. Between homicide rate ( $t$ ) and productivity ( $t - i$ )



E. Between productivity ( $t$ ) and illicit crop area ( $t - i$ )



F. Between illicit crop area ( $t$ ) and productivity ( $t - i$ )



Note: Confidence Interval at 90%.  
Source: Author's calculations.

## B. TIME SERIES ESTIMATIONS

VEC and VAR models provide a more precise estimation of the causal relationship between the three variables of interest: Area under illicit crops, homicide rates and TFP. Although the three variables should ideally be included in the same model, in practice this is not possible given the limited number of observations. In fact, the variable measuring the area under illicit crops is available only since 1975, severely reducing the degrees of freedom in a model with three equations. Therefore, we estimated a VAR model for each one of the three pairs of variables, rather than including the three variables jointly. The estimated impulse-response functions are shown in Figure 9.

All models shown in this section use first differences in logs of the variables of interest, given that they are all integrated of order one,  $I(1)$ , in levels (see Appendix 1). Also, the null hypothesis of cointegration between these variables can be rejected. Once stationary variables were obtained, we used the minimum number of lags—in each VAR model—that allows the errors to be normal while not exhibiting multivariate autocorrelations.

The first VAR(1) model uses first differences of the logs of area under illicit crops and TFP:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \Delta \ln(\text{Area})_t \\ \Delta \ln(\text{TFP})_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} C_1 \\ C_2 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \phi_{111} & \phi_{112} \\ \phi_{211} & \phi_{212} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \Delta \ln(\text{Area})_{t-1} \\ \Delta \ln(\text{TFP})_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{1t} \\ \varepsilon_{2t} \end{bmatrix}$$







Figure 9a shows that a positive shock in the growth of the area with illicit crops is associated with a permanent reduction in the growth of TFP. Also, the null hypothesis that changes in the log of Area do not Granger cause changes in the log of TFP can be rejected (see Appendix 2). Conversely, changes in TFP are not associated with significant changes in Area, and the corresponding hypothesis that TFP growth does not cause Area growth cannot be rejected (Figure 9b).

Turning to the relation between Area and Homicides we estimate a VAR (5) of the following form:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \Delta \ln(\text{Area})_t \\ \Delta \ln(\text{Homicide Rate})_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} C_1 \\ C_2 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \phi_{111} & \phi_{112} \\ \phi_{211} & \phi_{212} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \Delta \ln(\text{Area})_{t-1} \\ \Delta \ln(\text{Homicide Rate})_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \dots \\ \dots + \begin{bmatrix} \phi_{151} & \phi_{152} \\ \phi_{251} & \phi_{252} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \Delta \ln(\text{Area})_{t-5} \\ \Delta \ln(\text{Homicide Rate})_{t-5} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{3t} \\ \varepsilon_{4t} \end{bmatrix}$$



Figure 9  
Impulse-Response Functions



Note: Confidence Interval at 90% using 10,000 bootstrap replications.  
Orthogonal Impulse Response Function using Cholesky decomposition.  
Source: Author's calculations.

Figure 9c shows that positive shocks to changes in the log of Area cause permanent increases in changes in the log of the Homicide Rate. The corresponding Granger causality supports this interpretation (Appendix 2). Shocks to homicide rate do not seem to have an effect on Area (Figure 9d).

Finally, the relationship between Homicides and TFP is estimated with a VAR (12) of the following form:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \Delta \ln(\text{Homicide Rate})_t \\ \Delta \ln(\text{TFP})_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} C_1 \\ C_2 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \phi_{1,1,1} & \phi_{1,1,2} \\ \phi_{2,1,1} & \phi_{2,1,2} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \Delta \ln(\text{Homicide Rate})_{t-1} \\ \Delta \ln(\text{TFP})_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \dots \\ \dots + \begin{bmatrix} \phi_{1,12,1} & \phi_{1,12,2} \\ \phi_{2,12,1} & \phi_{2,12,2} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \Delta \ln(\text{Homicide Rate})_{t-12} \\ \Delta \ln(\text{TFP})_{t-12} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{5t} \\ \varepsilon_{6t} \end{bmatrix}$$

The results suggest that positive shocks to the change in the log of the homicide rate generate reductions in TFP growth (Figure 9e), while increases in TFP growth are associated with reductions in the growth of the Homicide Rate (Figure 9f). However, Granger causality tests indicate that causality runs from homicides to TFP, rather than the opposite (Appendix 2).

In sum, the evidence presented in this section strongly supports the view that the increase in the area under illicit crops was, to a large extent, an exogenous event which had very adverse consequences for Colombia. Challenging the conventional wisdom, which often sees drug trafficking activities as a consequence of insecurity and low growth, we argue just the opposite. Here, the increase in crime and the subsequent reduction in productivity are the result of a sudden increase in the production of illicit crops. This result has important policy implications because it suggests that a reduction in drug production can have a large economic dividend.

## VI. SOCIAL CONFLICT AND GROWTH: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE

The time series evidence shown in the previous section can be complemented with an analysis of the relationship between crime and growth using data from a large sample of countries. We do this in two steps. First, we look at the long-term relationship between homicides and per capita GDP for a large sample of countries. This evidence shows that countries with higher homicide rates tend to have lower incomes, even after controlling for potential endogeneity. Second, we look at a panel

of countries and estimate a growth model using data from the 1960s to 1990s. We do this with purpose of identifying the key variables that explain Colombia's growth deceleration since 1980.

#### A. LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIME AND INCOME

Although there is a debate on the specific mechanisms and their interaction, physical geography and institutions seem to be the two key determinants of the long-run performance of individual economies. According to the geography-driven models of growth, the prevalence of tropical conditions acts as a constraint to growth. The main reason is that technologies are ecologically-specific and that the technologies developed for the temperate zones are more productive. Also, technological innovation is an increasing returns activity, so the technological gap between tropical and temperate zones has widened (see Sachs, 2001).

Institutions have received a great deal of attention in the recent empirical growth literature. A number of papers show that property rights, appropriate regulatory structures, quality and independence of the judiciary, and bureaucratic capacity are essential pre-conditions and determinants of growth. For instance, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001 and 2002) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) argue that weak institutions, but not physical geography, explain variations in economic development across former colonies.<sup>15</sup>

Most of this literature takes as a starting point the estimation of 'benchmark' regression of the cross-country determinants of economic development of the following form:

$$\ln gdp_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Institutional Quality}_t + \beta_2 \text{Geography}_t + \varepsilon_t$$

The dependent variable is the natural log of real GNP per capita at purchasing parity in 1995 US dollars, LGNP95, as taken from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators*.

---

<sup>15</sup> These variables are highly interrelated. Tropical countries have relied on extractive activities that have resulted in rent-distributive institutions (in Colonial times and now), rather than institutions that promote local industry (see Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997). The question is whether geography has a direct impact on long term growth, for reasons different than its impact on institutions.

A frequent proxy for institutions is the risk of confiscation and forced nationalization of property, EXPROP, obtained from Political Risk Services.<sup>16</sup> Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) have noted that EXPROP is likely to be endogenous because high-income countries may be better able to protect property rights than poor countries. They use a measure of mortality rates from the early 15<sup>th</sup> century in logs, LMORT, as an instrument for EXPROP, although the sample of countries is severely reduced when LMORT is used.

Infant Mortality Rates in 1995 (deaths per 1000 live births; taken from the United Nations), IMR95, has been a frequent geographically-related variable used in the estimations.<sup>17</sup> Of course, joint endogeneity between health indicators and income also seems plausible. McArthur and Sachs (2001) have shown that cross-country differences in health are affected by physical geography (mainly because of disease incidence in tropical ecozones). Therefore, IMR95 can be instrumented using the mean annual temperature in Celsius, MEANTEMP; the portion of land area within 100 km of the sea coast, LT100KM (both from Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger, 1999); and the absolute value of latitude, LATABS (from La Porta *et al.*, 1999).<sup>18</sup>

Equations 1 and 2 in Table 4 replicate McArthur and Sachs (2001) and reiterate the point that EXPROP and IMR95 are powerful explanatory variables. The coefficients are highly significant and the R-squared is high (0.8). In the specific case of Colombia, the regressions predict a value for per capita GNP in 1995 which is between 1% and 4% below the observed level. This implies that the level of GNP in Colombia is quite in line with the value that corresponds to a country with that level of political institutions (as measured by EXPROP), health, and geography.

---

<sup>16</sup> The average value for Colombia over the period 1985-1995 (obtained from Sachs and McArthur, 2001) measured on a 1 to 10 scale (higher values imply lower expropriation risk) is 7.39, compared to a sample mean of 7.02. This implies that 46 countries (out of 118) have a lower risk of confiscation than Colombia.

<sup>17</sup> The value for Colombia is 30, compared to a world average of 48.

<sup>18</sup> Colombia's average temperature is 22.5° (Celsius). The absolute degree of latitude is 0.04°, indicating that most of the territory is tropical in an ecological sense. Only 16% of the land is within 100 km from the seacoast, making Colombia one of the most landlocked countries of the world (139 out of 150 countries have a higher proportion of the territory close to the seacoast).

However, it is clear that the risk of confiscation and forced nationalization of property does not capture the essence of Colombia's institutional problems. As argued in the previous section, the Homicide Rate is perhaps a better measure. For this reason, Equations 3 and 4 in Table 4 add the homicide rate in 1995 to the list of explanatory variables.<sup>19</sup> In Equation 3, the coefficient on HOMICIDES95 comes out with a negative sign but insignificantly different from zero. In Equation 4, which excludes


Table 4  
Institutions, Crime and Geography Regression Results

Regression dependent variable	1 LGNP95	2 LGNP95	3 LGNP95	4 LGNP95
Estimation	IV	IV	IV	IV
Constant	7.67	5.24	7.74	9.99
t-stat	10.54	4.14	10.22	103.8
EXPROP	0.22	0.52	0.23	
t-stat	2.95	3.45	3.09	
IMR95	-0.02	-0.012	-0.03	-0.04
t-stat	-4.06	-2.11	-3.32	-8.75
HOMICIDES95			-0.004	-0.01
t-stat			-1.05	-2.13
GINI60-70				
t-stat				
N	118	63	49	50
Ad R-sq	0.76	0.79	0.85	0.80
Residual for Colombia	0.0439	0.011	0.41	0.57
<b>Instruments:</b>				
MEANTEMP	✓	✓	✓	✓
LT100KM	✓	✓	✓	✓
LATABS	✓	✓	✓	✓
LMORT		✓		

Source: Author's calculations.

<sup>19</sup> The homicide rate comes from the U.N. Demographic Yearbooks and shows that Colombia had the *highest* homicide rate (80 per 100,000 inhabitants) among a group of 84 countries in 1995. In 1985 the rate was much lower (37.4 per 100,000 pop.), but even then there was only one country (out of 66) with a higher rate.

Figure 10  
Log (GNP95) vs. Homicides



Source: Author's calculations.

EXPROP, the effect of HOMICIDES95 is negative and significant. Figure 10 shows the partial correlation between the log of per capita GDP in 1995 and the homicide rate (controlling for the effect of infant mortality). Clearly, there is a negative correlation between income and crime.

Interestingly, Equation 4 does poorly in predicting Colombia's GDP. In fact, based on this simplified model, the 1995 levels of criminality and infant mortality would predict, in the steady state, a level of income between 41% and 57% below the level observed in that year. In other words, Colombia's level of income is higher than what corresponds to a country with such a high level of criminality.

One possible interpretation of this result is that the quality of institutions (in this case the homicide rate) in a given time period will affect the *growth rate* of the economy during that period, and not the contemporaneous *level* of income. In other words, the correct specification should use the growth rate during a time interval as the dependent variable. This structure is more appealing for the issue at hand, given that high criminality is a relatively recent phenomenon so it may have had on growth rates, but not yet on the per capita level of income. However, the regressions in levels are of interest because they suggest that if crime is not reduced, the level of income will fall in the long run (steady state) to a level consistent with the predictions of the model.

## B. EXPLAINING THE GROWTH DECELERATION IN A PANEL OF COUNTRIES

Given that our goal is to explain changes in growth rates across time periods (i.e. why Colombia's growth decelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, relative to the 1960s and 1970s) and across countries (why Colombia's growth decelerated during the 1990s, relative to the region) we should use country panel data on growth performance and its determinants.

In this section, following the work of Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderon (2005) we estimate the determinants of per capita GDP growth in an unbalanced panel of 65 countries where each observation corresponds to a 10-year average (for the years 1971-1980, 1981-1990, and 1991-1999) In total, there are 175 observations. The estimated equation has the following form:

$$\Delta y_{iT} = \delta_1 \ln y_{iT_0} + \delta_2 gap_{iT_0} + \beta_3 X_{iT} + \mu_T + \eta_i$$

where  $\Delta y_{iT}$  is growth rate of output per capita in country  $i$  during decade  $T$ . The right hand side variables include the level of per capita income at the beginning of the decade:  $\ln y_{iT_0}$  (to capture transitional convergence); the output gap (also at the start of the decade) based on the Baxter-King filter:  $gap_{iT_0}$ , a set of explanatory variables ( $X_{iT}$ ), a decade-specific effect ( $\mu_T$ ), and unobserved country specific factors ( $\eta_i$ ) which are potentially correlated with the explanatory variables.

The inclusion of the output gap as an explanatory variable controls for movements in cyclical output and, thus, differentiates between transitional convergence and cyclical reversion. The decade-specific effect controls for changes in external conditions that affect all countries alike (i.e. the debt crisis of the 1980s).

Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderon (2005) use two types of explanatory variables ( $X_{iT}$ ).<sup>20</sup> The first class includes variables that measure external shocks and the quality of macro policies. These are variables that are more likely to explain changes in growth performance in one country across time:

*Shocks to the terms of trade:* Measured as the log difference of the terms of trade, measured in the customary way.

<sup>20</sup> See their book for a complete description of the variables, including data sources and a literature review of the studies that have used similar variables.

*Lack of price stability:* Measured by the average inflation rate for the corresponding country and decade.

*Cyclical volatility of GDP:* Measured by the standard deviation of the output gap for the corresponding country and decade.

*External imbalances and the risk of balance-of-payments crises:* Measured by an index of real exchange rate overvaluation.

*Systemic banking crises:* Measured by the fraction of years that a country undergoes a systemic banking crisis in the corresponding period, as identified in Caprio and Klingebiel (1999).

The second class, and the one of interest from the viewpoint of this paper, includes some structural variables that have been identified in the empirical cross section growth literature as powerful determinants of growth (more often across countries than across time). The variables used in their specification are:

*Education:* Measured as the rate of gross secondary-school enrollment.

*Financial depth:* Measured by the ratio of private domestic credit supplied by private financial institutions to GDP.

*International trade openness:* Measured by the volume of trade (real exports plus imports) over GDP, adjusted for the size (area and population) of the country, for whether it is landlocked, and for whether it is an oil exporter.<sup>21</sup>

*Government burden:* Measured by the ratio of government consumption to GDP.

*Public services and infrastructure:* Measured by the number of main telephone lines per capita.

*Governance* is the final element in the list of structural variables. This is a wide area that covers aspects such as the institutional quality of government, including the

---

<sup>21</sup> This is a standard procedure that uses the fitted values of a regression of trade volume on those variables.



respect for civil and political rights, bureaucratic efficiency, absence of corruption, enforcement of contractual agreements, and prevalence of law and order. Evidently, there are many variables related to the concept of governance, and choosing one is somewhat an arbitrary decision. Writing on the uses and abuses of these indicators, Arndt and Oman (2006) show that the most widely used are composite perceptions-based indicators. They argue that even the most carefully constructed of these indicators lack transparency and comparability over time, and suffer from selection bias.

Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón (2005) use the first principal component of four indicators reported by Political Risk Services in their publication *International Country Risk Guide* (ICRG). These are the indicators on the prevalence of law and order, quality of the bureaucracy, absence of corruption, and accountability of public officials. All of them enter with almost identical weights in their first principal component.

Although the perfect governance indicator does not exist, we prefer to use the homicide rates for three reasons. First, the measure chosen by Loayza *et al.* (2005) does not come out significant in all of their estimations. Second, homicide rates have some variation between decades which would be useful to exploit. Third, from the discussion of the previous sections we know that the increase in homicides rates has a potentially relevant role in explaining Colombia's growth deceleration.

Data on homicides come from the United Nations World Surveys on Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Systems.<sup>22</sup> These surveys have been implemented every five years since 1970 in 157 countries. Crime variables include counts of recorded crime for homicide, assault, rape, robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, embezzlement, drug trafficking, drug possession, bribery, and corruption. There are also counts of suspects, persons prosecuted, persons convicted, and prison admissions by crime, gender, and adult or juvenile status.<sup>23</sup> The countries participating in the survey and the variables available vary by year. To maximize the number of observations we use information

---

<sup>22</sup> See Burnham and Burnham (1999) for a complete description of the data.


<sup>23</sup> Other variables include the population of the country and largest city; budgets and salaries for police, courts, and prisons; and types of sanctions, including imprisonment, corporal punishment, deprivation of liberty, control of freedom, warning, fine, and community sentence.

on average homicide rates per decade.<sup>24</sup> Figure 11 shows the data, which suggests that Colombia became an outlier in this matter during the 1980s and 1990s.

C. PANEL RESULTS

Table 5 shows the results of an OLS pooled regression. Equation 1 replicates the original estimation of Loayza *et al.* (2005), while equation 2 uses the homicide rate

Figure 11



Source: Loayza *et al.* (2002) and Burnham *et al.* (1999).

24 This gives more observations than measuring homicide rates at the beginning of the decade.

Table 5  
Growth Determinants Panel Regressions

Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita, by decade: 1971-1999  
(*t*-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficient)

Category	Variable	Eq. 1	Eq. 2
Convergence factors	Initial GDP per capita	-0.023	-0.025
	(in logs)	(-4.290)	(-4.880)
Cyclical reversion	Initial output gap	-0.052	-0.069
	(log[Actual GDP/potential GDP])	(-0.720)	(-0.970)
Structural policies and institutions	Education	0.014	0.014
	(secondary enrollment, in logs)	(2.910)	(3.120)
	Financial depth	0.001	0.001
	(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs)	(0.390)	(0.300)
	Trade openness	0.010	0.009
	(structure adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs)	(2.420)	(2.020)
	Government burden	-0.013	-0.009
	(government consumption/GDP, in logs)	(-2.210)	(-1.490)
	Public infrastructure	0.012	0.012
	(main telephone lines per capita, in logs)	(3.800)	(3.740)
Stabilization policies	Governance	-0.001	
	(1st principal component of ICRG indicator)	(-0.570)	
	Lack of price stability	-0.015	-0.015
	(inflation rate, in log[100+inf. rate])	(-2.830)	(-2.870)
	Cyclical volatility	-0.058	-0.057
	(Std. Dev. of output gap)	(-0.410)	(-0.430)
	Real exchange rate overvaluation	-0.011	-0.014
(in logs; index is proportional, overvaluation if > 100)	(-2.200)	(-2.800)	
Systemic banking crises	Systemic banking crises	0.000	0.003
	(frequency of years under crisis: 0-1)	(0.000)	(0.340)
External conditions	Terms of trade shocks	0.128	0.124
	(growth rate of terms of trade)	(2.590)	(2.590)
Criminality	Homicide rate per 100.000 inhabitants		<b>-0.003</b>
	(in logs)		<b>(-2.290)</b>
Number of observations:		123	123
R-squared		0.479	0.502

Source: Author's calculations.

instead of their measure of governance. The estimated coefficient is not only negative and significant, but also quantitatively very large: An increment of 1% in homicide rates is associated with a 0.3 percentage points reduction in per capita GDP growth. Finally, Table 6 shows the observed per capita growth rates for Colombia, the fitted values predicted by the model, and the corresponding error of the regression. According to the model estimated in equation 2, growth should have increased in the 1990s by 0.5 percentage points, relative to the 1980s. Since actual growth was 0.6 percentage points lower, there is still an unexplained factor that accounts for the deceleration. However, when the homicide rate (eq. 2) is added, the model predicts a lower growth rate during the 1990s than the original estimation in Loayza *et al.* (2005). This implies that the inclusion of the homicide rate is a key factor explaining why growth decelerated in the 1990s relative to the 1980s.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

Colombia's GDP has been growing at an average rate of 3% per year since 1980, which represents a slowdown of 2 percentage points per year relative to the period between 1950 and 1979. This paper analyzes the possible causes of such a prolonged deceleration in growth, which has had devastating consequences on welfare.

The paper looks at this issue in three steps. First, it deals with the proximate causes of growth (the standard sources-of-growth-decomposition) and concludes that the deceleration of growth is the result of an implosion of productivity. This is interesting because it implies that both physical and human capital accumulation were not the cause of the reduction in growth. Indeed, this reduction is explained entirely by changes in productivity growth. Prior to 1980, productivity gains added 1 percentage

Table 6  
 Change in the Growth Rate of GDP per Capita (percentage)  
 Based on regressions from Table 5

Decade	Actual change (%)	Estimated change (%)		Error (%)	
		Eq. 1	Eq. 2	Eq. 1	Eq. 2
1980s vs. 1970s	-1.78	-2.92	-1.87	1.14	0.09
1990s vs. 1980s	-0.55	2.11	0.53	-2.66	-1.08

Source: Loayza *et al.* (2002) and author's calculations.

point to the per-capita GDP growth on average per year. Since 1980, productivity losses have been subtracting a similar amount.

In the second step, the paper deals with the determinants of productivity using the time series evidence. The conclusion is that the implosion of productivity is directly related to the four-fold increase in criminality. The existing literature has already shown that the explosion of crime was the result of the rapid expansion of drug-trafficking activities and the intensification of the internal armed conflict (fueled by the rents from the drug trade). Thus, the paper argues that it is not a coincidence that the implosion of productivity, the increase in crime, the expansion of drug-trafficking, and the strengthening of the insurgent movements, occurred at the same time, starting around 1980. However, the evidence suggests the presence of causal relation from drugs to crime, and from crime to productivity. This is of interest because it supports the idea that reducing drug rents has a large economic dividend.

The third step focuses on the cross-country evidence. Countries with high homicide rates grow less and have lower per capita incomes. Moreover, Colombia's growth deceleration during the 1990s (relative to the 1980s) can be partially explained by its high homicide rate.

## REFERENCES

1. Acemoglu, D.; Johnson, S.; Robinson, J. A. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation", *American Economic Review*, vol. 91, no. 4, pp. 1369-1401, 2001.
2. Acemoglu, D.; Johnson, S.; Robinson, J. A. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 117, Issue 4, November, pp. 1231-1294, 2002.
3. Alesina, A.; Rodrik, D. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 109, Issue 4, pp. 465-490, 1994.
4. Antoshin, S.; Berg, A.; Ostry, J.; Souto, M.; Zettelmeyer, J. "Testing for Structural Breaks in Economic Growth around the World: Methodologies and Evidence" (unpublished mimeograph), 2007.
5. Arango, C. A.; Misas, M.; López, E. "Economía subterránea en Colombia, 1976-2003: una medición a partir de la demanda de efectivo", *Borradores de Economía*, Banco de la República de Colombia, no. 335, 2004.
6. Arndt, C.; Oman, C. "Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators", OCDE, Development Centre Studies, 2006.
7. Bai, J.; Perron, P. "Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple Structural Changes", *Econometrica*, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 47-78, 1998.
8. Bai, J.; Perron, P. "Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural Change Models", *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, vol. 18, Issue 1, pp. 1-22, 2003a.
9. Bai, J.; Perron, P. "Critical Values for Multiple Structural Change Tests", *Econometrics Journal*, vol. 6, Issue 1, 2003b, pp. 72-78.
10. Ben-David, D.; Papell, D. "Slowdowns and Meltdowns: Postwar Growth Evidence from 74 Countries", NBER Working Paper, no. 6266, 1997.
11. Berg, A.; Ostry, Jonathan, D.; Zettelmeyer, J. "What Makes Growth Sustained?" (unpublished mimeograph), Fondo Monetario Internacional, November, 2006.
12. Burnham, R. W.; Burnham, H. "United Nations World Surveys on Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Systems, 1970-1994: Restructured Five-Wave Data ICPSR version", Washington, D. C., U. S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1999.
13. Caprio, G.; Klingebiel, D. "Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises" (mimeograph) World Bank, 1999.
14. Collier, P. "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy", Banco Mundial, June, p. 21, 2000.
15. Edwards, S.; Steiner, R. "On the Crisis Hypothesis of Economic Reform: Colombia 1989-91", *Cuadernos de Economía*, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, no. 112, December, pp. 445-493, 2000.
16. Engerman, S.; Sokoloff, K. "Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth among the New World Economies", Steven Haber (ed.) *How Latin American Fell Behind*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1997.
17. Flórez, C. E. *Las transformaciones sociodemográficas en Colombia durante el siglo XX. Economía, siglo XX*. Banco de la República-Tercer Mundo Editores, 2000.
18. Gallup, J.; Sachs, J.; Mellinger, A. "Geography and Economic Development", *International Regional Science Review*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 179-232, 1999.
19. Gaviria, A. "Increasing Returns and the Evolution of Violent Crime: The case of Colombia", *Journal of Development Economics*, vol. 61, 2000.
20. Glaeser, E. L.; La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?", NBER Working Paper, num. 10568, 2004.
21. Gwartney, J.; Lawson, R.; Block, W. *Economic Freedom of the World, 1975-1995*, Fraser Institute, 1996.

22. Hall, R. E.; Jones, C. I. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. CXIV, pp. 83-116, 1999.
23. Inglehart, R. "Codebook for World Values Survey", ICPSR, num. 6160, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1994.
24. Jagers, K.; Gurr, T. R. "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with Polity III Data", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 469-482, 1995.
25. Knack, S.; Keefer, P. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures", *Economics and Politics*, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 207-228, 1995.
26. Kurian, G. T. *The New Book of World Rankings*, 3rd ed., Facts on File Books, New York, 1991.
27. La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A.; Vishny, R. "The Quality of Government", *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 222-279, 1999.
28. Lederman, D.; Loayza, N.; Menéndez, A. "Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter?", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 50 Issue 3, April, p. 509-539, 2002.
29. Loayza, N.; Fajnzylber, P.; Calderón, C. *Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean: Stylized Facts, Explanations, and Forecasts*, World Bank, working paper 265, 2004.
30. Mauro, P. "Corruption and Growth", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 110, no. 3, August, pp. 681-712, 1995.
31. McArthur, J.; Sachs, J. "Institutions and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000)", NBER Working Paper, no. 8114, 2001.
32. Messner, S.; Rosenfeld, R. "Social Structure and Homicide: Theory and Research", *Homicide: A Sourcebook of Social Research*, 1998, pp. 27-41.
33. Moser, C.; Shrader, E. "A Conceptual Framework for Violence Reduction" (unpublished mimeograph), LCSES, World Bank, Washington, D. C., 1998.
34. Moser, C.; Holland, J. *Urban Poverty and Violence in Jamaica*. World Bank Latin American and the Caribbean Studies Viewpoints, Washington, D. C., World Bank, 1997.
35. Núñez, J.; Sánchez, F. "A Dynamic Analysis Of Household Decision Making in Urban Colombia, 1976-1998, Changes in Household Structure, Human Capital and its Returns, and Female Labor Force Participation" (mimeograph), CEDE, Universidad de los Andes, 2000.
36. Ocampo, J. A. *Entre las reformas y el conflicto: economía y política en Colombia*, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 2004.
37. Psacharopoulos, G. "Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update", *World Development*, vol. 22, no. 9, pp. 1325-1343, 1994.
38. Rangel, A. "Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy in Colombia", *Journal of International Affairs*, no. 2, pp. 577-601, 2000.
39. Robison, L.; Siles, M. E. "Social Capital and Household Income Distribution in the United States: 1980, 1990", *Department of Agricultural Economics (red.) num. 595*, Michigan State University, Lansing, Michigan, 1997.
40. Rocha, R. "The Colombian Economy after 25 Years of Drug Trafficking", UNDCP, 2000.
41. Rodrik, D. "Where Did All Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses" (manuscript), Harvard University, 1998.
42. Rodrik, D. "Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them", NBER Working Paper, no. 7540, 2000.
43. Rodrik, D.; Subramanian, A.; Trebbi, F. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development", NBER Working Paper, no. 9305, 2002.

44. Rosenfeld, R; Messner, S. F. "Beyond the Criminal Justice System: Anomie, Institutional Vitality, and Crime in the United States", paper presented at the meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco (CA), 1998.
45. Rosenfeld, R.; Messner, S. F.; Baumer, E. P. "Social Capital and Homicide" (unpublished mimeograph), Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 1999.
46. Sachs, J.; Warner, A. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth", NBER Working Paper, no. 5395, 1995.
47. Sachs, J. "Tropical Underdevelopment", NBER Working Paper, num. 8119, 2001.
48. Sachs, J. "Institutions Don't Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income", NBER Working Paper, num. 9490, 2003.
49. Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos (SIMCI). "Censo de cultivos de coca 2005" (unpublished mimeograph), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Colombian Government, 2006.
50. Steiner, R. Los dólares del narcotráfico, Cuadernos de Fedesarrollo, no. 2, Bogotá, 1997.
51. United Nations. "World Population Prospects 1950-2050. Revised", New York, 1996.



## APPENDIX 1

Table A.1  
Unit Root Tests

Series	Deterministic	ADF	Critical value (5%)	Result	KPSS	Critical value (5%)	Result	Sample
log(area)	Constant	-2.92	-2.97	I(1)	0.574	0.463	I(1)	1976-2005
log(TFP)	Constant	-2.75	-2.92	I(1)	0.351	0.463	I(0)*	1955-2005
log(homicide rate)	Constant	-1.23	-2.92	I(1)	0.757	0.463	I(1)	1958-2005

\* I(1) at 10%.

Source: Author's calculations.

## APPENDIX 2

Table A.2  
Granger Causality Test

Variable	Lags in VAR	Null hypothesis	Result at 5%	P value F test
Growth in homicide rate	5	Cultivated area does not granger cause homicide rate	Reject null	0.0078
Growth in cultivated area	5	Homicide rate does not granger cause cultivated area	Cannot reject null	0.8820
Growth in homicide rate	12	Productivity does not granger cause homicide rate	Cannot reject null	0.5207
Growth in productivity	12	Homicide rate does not granger cause productivity	Reject null	0.0011
Growth in cultivated area	1	Cultivated area does not granger cause productivity	Reject null	0.0466
Growth in productivity	1	Productivity does not granger cause cultivated area	Cannot reject null	0.4182

Source: Author's calculations.